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Buying Teams 
Andres Sawicki* 
The Sixth Annual Berle Symposium reflects on Margaret Blair and 
Lynn Stout’s classic article: A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law. Blair and Stout recast the modern law of public corporations 
through the lens of the team production theory of the firm. Here, I apply 
Blair and Stout’s insights—emphasizing the value of team production, 
independent monitors, and intellectual property rights—to a novel corpo-
rate transaction structure: the acqui-hire. 
In an acqui-hire, a publicly owned technology firm wants to add a 
start-up’s engineers. Instead of simply hiring them, though, it buys the 
start-up, discards most of its assets, and retains the start-up’s engineers. 
These transactions are puzzling because, even though the buyer is osten-
sibly interested only in hiring the start-up’s engineers, some of the com-
pensation is nonetheless diverted to the start-up’s investors. 
The only existing analysis of acqui-hires in the legal literature ar-
gues that cooperative norms in Silicon Valley are the primary driver of 
these transactions. While that analysis sheds useful light on important 
aspects of these deals, it underplays the importance of intellectual prop-
erty, especially patents. Patents can facilitate the organization of team 
production in several ways, including by increasing the costs to team 
members of leaving the team. Large technology firms cannot acquire 
those patent rights by simply hiring the start-up’s engineers; instead, they 
must buy the start-up itself. Patent law is therefore a partial driver of the 
choice to pursue an acqui-hire because it enables the buyer to obtain as-
sets useful in team production. A preliminary investigation using a novel 
dataset of sixty-three acqui-hires during the years 2011 and 2012 sup-
ports this proposition. The investigation reveals that, contrary to the pat-
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tern for all of the start-up’s other assets, existing and future patent rights 
typically follow the engineers to the buyer. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In their landmark article, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout applied the insights of the team pro-
duction theory of the firm to develop a descriptive and normative theory 
of corporate law.1 The team production theory takes as its starting point a 
production process in which several inputs are combined, the inputs 
make team-specific investments, and the gains from the production are 
nonseparable.2 The scope of team production theory thus includes much 
of the work of American public corporations, which are the focus of A 
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law.3 But not all production pro-
cesses are best understood in team production terms. Closely held organ-
izations, for example, may be better described by the property rights the-
ory of the firm.4 Scholars building on Blair and Stout’s contribution 
should therefore begin their analyses by identifying production processes 
for which the team production theory offers the most useful frame.5 
One potentially fruitful place to look for these kinds of production 
processes is in the fields regulated by intellectual property law.6 The 
classic vision of intellectual property is that of an individual working 
alone to produce expressive works or inventions—in other words, the 
romantic ideal of the sole author or inventor.7 But this vision does not 
accurately depict the real world of creative production. Instead, creative 
                                                 
 1. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
 2. Id. at 249. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 272–73. 
 5. See Elizabeth Pollman, Team Production Theory and Private Company Boards, 38 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 619 (2015) (arguing that team production theory can help explain the structure of at least 
some private company boards). 
 6. I use the phrase “intellectual property law” here to refer to copyright and patent law (and, to 
a lesser extent, trade secret law), in line with other scholars who focus on the laws regulating the 
production of expressive works and inventions. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experi-
mental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2014). 
 7. See Mario Biagioli, Genius Against Copyright: Revisiting Fichte’s Proof of the Illegality of 
Reprinting, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847, 1847–48 (2011) (“The ‘romantic author’ or ‘romantic 
genius’ has been central to the history and critique of copyright for a few decades now.”); id. at 
1847–48 nn.1–2 (citing sources supporting and critiquing the centrality of the romantic author); 
Christopher Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 52, 57–61 (2009) (describing the historical influence of the individual inventor motif on pa-
tent law, particularly in the legislative and administrative branches); Mark D. Janis, Patent Aboli-
tionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 907–21 (2002) (describing genesis of heroic inventor motif 
and influence on early patent law). 
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people frequently collaborate to produce creative works,8 and this pro-
duction is plagued by the problems described by team production theo-
rists.9 
In a prior work with Anthony Casey, we explored these sorts of 
team production problems in fields that are regulated by copyright law.10 
Consider, for example, a movie. Each actor must spend time reading the 
script and internalizing the characters’ motivations, history, and so on. 
Although there may be some spillover to other movies in which the actor 
undertakes similar roles or otherwise performs similar work, the bulk of 
this time is a team-specific investment—it creates much more value for 
this project than for any other. Each actor’s investment must also be 
combined with the others’ investments. And at the end of the project, it 
will be difficult to tell who is responsible for each part of the total value 
of the finished film. This is precisely the scenario contemplated by the 
team production theory of the firm. Copyright law’s ownership rules 
(like the “work made for hire” doctrine11) and scope rules (like the deriv-
ative works right12) therefore affect participants’ ability to solve these 
problems using the organizational solutions proposed by team production 
theorists.13 
Team production problems are also likely pervasive in the fields 
regulated by patent law. Consider the development of a new drug.14 Drug 
development requires joint contributions by people with diverse expertise, 
including chemists, molecular biologists, and clinicians. Each of these 
individuals will invest time and resources producing information that is 
most useful to the development of this drug, and much less useful to the 
                                                 
 8. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012). 
 9. See Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683 
(2013) (applying the insights of team production theory to explain the effect of copyright law on the 
organization of the creative industries); see id. at 1700 (team production problems include difficulty 
(1) observing team members’ performance, (2) verifying to outsiders team members’ (non-
)compliance with agreements, (3) attributing output value to particular inputs, and (4) predicting 
total output value). 
 10. See generally id. 
 11. The “work made for hire” doctrine vests ownership in the person who hired the author of a 
copyrighted work when either: (1) the author is an employee working within the scope of her em-
ployment, or (2) the work is a within a statutorily-identified category and there is a written agree-
ment specifying that the work is a work made for hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (defining a work 
made for hire); Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1723 (explaining the work made for hire rules). 
 12. The “derivative works right” grants to the owner of the copyright in an original work the 
right to also make new works “based upon” the original. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2010), 106(2) (2002) 
(defining the derivative works right); Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1726 (describing the deriva-
tive works right). 
 13. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1712–39. 
 14. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 265–67 (explaining why drug development likely poses 
team production problems). 
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development of any other drug. The end product—a new drug—will be 
the result of their joint contributions, and it will be difficult to ascertain 
the degree to which any one individual is responsible for the joint output. 
Legal academics have so far overlooked the team production theory 
of the firm as a source of insight into patent law’s effects on the organi-
zation of innovative activity;15 the recent Silicon Valley trend of acqui-
hiring may be a catalyst for further research on these issues. An acqui-
hire is a transaction in which a large technology company (the buyer)16 
purchases a start-up with the primary purpose of employing the start-up’s 
engineers; the buyer is not interested in the start-up’s existing projects, 
customer relationships, or other corporate assets.17 The start-ups are in-
volved in innovative activity ostensibly regulated by patent law.18 And in 
the course of the acqui-hire, the engineers—the core innovative employ-
ees involved in team production activities—move from a closely held 
firm to a large public corporation. An exploration of the acqui-hire may 
therefore yield useful insights into the interaction of teams, patents, and 
corporate law. 
The motives underlying a firm’s choice to pursue an acqui-hire are 
not immediately clear. In an acqui-hire, a portion of the purchase price is 
split among the start-up’s equity holders. These equity holders include 
not only the engineers, who are the source of the buyer’s interest in the 
transaction, but also venture capitalists, angel investors, and early non-
engineer employees who have earned some form of equity compensation. 
The acqui-hire thus presents a puzzle: if the acquiring company simply 
wants to add the start-up’s engineers, why does it bother purchasing the 
                                                 
 15. For two exceptions to this general neglect, see Paul J. Heald, A Transactions Cost Theory 
of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 487–98 (2005) (arguing that patents can help facilitate organi-
zational solutions to team production problems), and Robert Merges, The Law and Economics of 
Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20–26 (1999) (using team production theory to 
justify corporate ownership of employee inventions). There is a growing literature using other theo-
ries of the firm—notably the property-rights theory of the firm—to explore these and related issues. 
See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1687 n.14 (citing sources). 
 16. For ease of exposition, I will use the term “buyer” to refer to the firm to which the engi-
neers go, even in scenarios like a group hire where, strictly speaking, the firm is not “buying” any-
thing. I will also use the term “start-up” to refer to the firm the engineers are leaving, and the term 
“engineers” to refer to the computer programmers that the buyer is recruiting. 
 17. See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 283 (2013). 
 18. The patentability of software has not always been accepted.  See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. 
Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (2001) 
(recounting the history of courts deciding software patentability questions). The Supreme Court has 
recently reaffirmed that at least some software patents claim patentable subject matter, although the 
proper scope of such patents remains unclear. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 
(2014). 
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start-up instead of pursuing a group hire?19 In an ordinary group hire, the 
purchase price would be shared only among the engineers, who comprise 
the primary asset of interest to the buyer. If the equity holders have no 
claim to the asset motivating the transaction, then why are they sharing 
in the total price being paid by the buyer? 
The only existing legal academic analysis of acqui-hires argues that 
Silicon Valley norms provide most of the explanatory power for the in-
creasing prevalence of this transaction structure.20 In their intriguing arti-
cle, Professors Coyle and Polsky explain that the engineer-founders of 
the start-ups could leave as a group and join the buyer without fear of 
legal consequences.21 This is because California law severely restricts 
noncompete agreements and because spurned Silicon Valley investors 
strongly prefer not to sue the entrepreneurs they have backed.22 But the 
engineer-founders nonetheless agree to structure their moves as acqui-
hires largely to avoid informal sanctions that their investors could impose 
if those investors were unhappy with the way in which the venture 
wound down.23 This desire to avoid informal sanctions is buttressed by 
(1) the reputational benefits engineers receive from being able to say 
their start-up was sold; (2) Silicon Valley’s cooperative legal culture; (3) 
the engineers’ underestimation of the financial costs of the acqui-hire; 
and (4) tax considerations that reduce the actual financial costs of the 
acqui-hire to the engineers.24 
The role of intellectual property in the acqui-hire phenomenon, 
however, remains ambiguous. In a prototypical acqui-hire, the buyer 
does not acquire any of the start-up’s assets, whether tangible (like facili-
ties and equipment) or intangible (like customer lists and goodwill).25 
But the attorneys, engineers, and investors who participated in acqui-
hires—and formed the basis for Coyle and Polsky’s analysis—provide 
conflicting descriptions of what happens to the start-up’s intellectual 
                                                 
 19. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 301 (posing the “existential puzzle” of the acqui-hire). 
 20. Id. at 312–19. Coyle and Polsky limit the scope of their claims to Silicon Valley start-ups 
acquired by California firms because much of their analysis depends on norms particular to that 
region and the law of that state. Id. at 286 n.12. Because my interest lies in the possibility that legal 
rights—specifically, patent rights—might interact with team production value to contribute to the 
use of this kind of transaction, I do not so limit my analysis. Of course, many of the start-ups in the 
data presented here are in fact Silicon Valley start-ups acquired by California firms. It is nonetheless 
worth emphasizing that at least part of the reason why the story here diverges from the Coyle and 
Polsky story is this difference in scope. 
 21. Id. at 302–10. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 312–19. 
 24. Id. at 320–31. 
 25. Id. at 293–94. 
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property.26 I aim to address the resulting uncertainty by answering two 
questions: what happens to the patents in an acqui-hire? And why? 
As to the first question, patents tend to follow the engineers from 
the start-up to the buyer. I report here the results of a preliminary investi-
gation of the patent rights associated with a set of acqui-hires completed 
by several large technology firms between 2011 and 2012.27 Because the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) maintains a publicly accessible da-
tabase of patent assignments, it is possible to track the patents and appli-
cations that have been transferred from the start-ups to the buyers in the-
se acqui-hires.28 Using this information, I show that the near-universal 
pattern in an acqui-hire is for the start-up’s patent rights to follow the 
engineers to the buyer. Although this data is preliminary and subject to a 
number of caveats, it at least suggests that patents play some nontrivial 
role in the acqui-hire phenomenon. 
Answering the second question—why does this pattern prevail—is 
more difficult. It is possible, for example, that the patents can serve a 
defensive role for the buyer (which may be a target for vexatious litiga-
tion) that they cannot serve for the start-up (which will soon cease opera-
tions). Another hypothesis is that patents have team-specific value.29 Pa-
tents may serve as a mechanism for mitigating the shirking problems en-
demic in team production contexts. They can do so by, among other 
things, raising the costs to team members who defect from the team. If 
patents serve this function, then it is sensible for buyers to prefer acqui-
hires to group hires—the former facilitates the buyer’s acquisition of 
team-preserving patents and the latter does not. Although the data here 
do not permit us to choose between these two hypotheses, they do make 
it unlikely that patents are irrelevant to acqui-hires. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the acqui-hire 
transaction and reviews the leading legal academic theory for why they 
occur. Part III briefly explains patent ownership rules in the start-up con-
text, and then presents the data from this preliminary investigation into 
the patterns of patent assignments in acqui-hires. Part III also offers a 
potential explanation for that pattern. Part IV concludes with some sug-
gestions for further research. 
                                                 
 26. Id. at 293 n.38. 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 102–15. 
 28. Because of confidentiality rules regarding pending patent applications and because not all 
patent assignments are recorded, the data presented here likely understates the role of patents in 
acqui-hires. See infra text accompanying notes 156–60. 
 29. See Heald, supra note 15, at 487–98; Merges, supra note 15, at 20–26; infra text accompa-
nying notes 133–40. 
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II. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM REGARDING ACQUI-HIRES 
Firms regularly acquire other firms. In an ordinary acquisition, the 
buyer wants to purchase the seller’s assets, which can include tangible 
things, like factories or real property, or intangible things, like customer 
relationships.30 In these scenarios, the buyer and seller can agree to struc-
ture the transaction in a number of ways.31 What these transactions have 
in common is that the buyer obtains all (or substantially all) of the sell-
er’s business. 
In other instances, a firm is only interested in hiring some or all of 
another firm’s at-will employees. 32  When this occurs, the buyer ap-
proaches the employees whom it wishes to hire, either individually or as 
a group. If they are satisfied with the offered terms, the employees leave 
their current employer and go work for the buyer. Because the employees 
are at-will, the current employer does not have a say in whether the 
transaction occurs or not.33 I will refer to these scenarios as group hires. 
The technology industry has recently begun engaging in a third 
kind of transaction: the acqui-hire.34 In an acqui-hire, the buyer has the 
same motivation as it does in a group hire—it wants to hire another 
firm’s at-will employees.35 But instead of simply hiring those employees, 
the buyer structures the transaction as an ordinary acquisition, purchasing 
all of the other firm’s business and assets. Once the buyer does so, 
though, it discards the acquired firm’s assets, and keeps only the em-
ployees in which it was interested.36 
In these transactions, the buyer is usually a large technology com-
pany, like Google or Facebook.37 The desired at-will employees are the 
engineers of a start-up.38 The transaction typically occurs either between 
                                                 
 30. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 293. 
 31. The most common forms are asset purchases, stock purchases, and mergers. See John C. 
Coates IV, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Restructuring, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE LAW 
AND GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3–7), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463251. 
 32. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 301. 
 33. When the employees have employment contracts with the seller firm, that transforms their 
employment into something other than at-will, and the seller firm will have a say in whether the 
employees leave to join the buyer. 
 34. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 293–301. 
 35. Id. at 293–94. 
 36. Id. at 293–97. 
 37. Id. at 283; Miguel Heft, For Buyers of Web Start-Ups, Quest to Corral Young Talent, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2011, at A1. 
 38. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 283–84; see also Dan Bobkoff, Employee Shopping: 
‘Acqui-Hire’ Is the New Normal in Silicon Valley, NPR (Sept. 24, 2012, 3:23 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/09/25/161573307/employee-shopping-acqui-hire-
is-the-new-normal-in-silicon-valley. 
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the seed funding and Series A financing rounds, or between the Series A 
and Series B financing rounds; this is because that is usually the point 
when it becomes clear that the start-up is unlikely to successfully launch 
a product before it runs out of financing.39 Even though the engineers are 
at-will employees, and therefore free to leave even without their employ-
er’s consent, the buyer chooses to purchase the start-up.40 
As a result, the price the buyer pays to obtain the engineers’ ser-
vices is split in two.41 One part—called the compensation pool—is dis-
tributed to the newly hired engineers.42 A second part—called the deal 
consideration pool—is distributed to the start-up’s shareholders.43 These 
shareholders typically include not only the engineers (who are often 
granted stock options during the early stages of the firm’s life), but also 
other early employees, angel investors, and venture capitalists. 44  Alt-
hough the precise forms of the two pools vary,45 the common thread 
through all acqui-hires is the existence of these two separate pools. 
As mentioned above, the acqui-hire thus presents a puzzle: if the 
only asset of interest to the buyer is the future employment of the start-
up’s engineers, then why is any money being distributed to the start-up’s 
shareholders?46 We can start with the premise that the buyer values add-
ing the engineers in an amount equal to the combined value of the deal 
consideration and the compensation pool because this is the total amount 
that the buyer spends to add the engineers.47 The existence of a compen-
sation pool is no surprise—the buyer has to pay the engineers some 
amount to convince the engineers to work for the buyer, and the compen-
sation pool represents that amount. It is the existence of the deal consid-
eration pool that is puzzling. If the buyer values the engineers in an 
amount equal to the compensation pool plus the deal consideration pool, 
                                                 
 39. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 295. 
 40. Id. at 296–97. 
 41. Id. at 297. 
 42. Id. at 297–98. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 297. 
 45. Id. at 296–98 (describing variations in the details of acqui-hires). 
 46. Id. at 301 n.75. 
 47. The buyer evidently values the future employment at the total purchase price (compensa-
tion pool plus deal consideration pool), so the seller’s employees should be able to negotiate for that 
amount. On the other hand, the seller’s employees are willing to leave the seller for just the compen-
sation pool (plus whatever percentage of the deal consideration pool they are entitled to as share-
holders of the seller firm), so the buyer should be able to convince them to join the seller firm for 
just the compensation pool amount. As a result, we should expect the buyer and the seller’s employ-
ees to negotiate some split of the deal consideration pool that is sent to the seller’s shareholders in an 
acqui-hire. 
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the engineers should be able to obtain more than just the compensation 
pool.48 Why is money being diverted to the start-up’s shareholders? 
Shareholders typically do not have rights to the assets the buyer 
values: the engineers’ future employment services. While a firm’s share-
holders could have claims to the labor of its employees if the firm has 
fixed-term employment or noncompete agreements with the employees, 
start-up engineers do not ordinarily sign fixed-term employment agree-
ments.49 Moreover, California law refuses to enforce noncompetes.50 Be-
cause the start-up’s shareholders generally have no legal claims to the 
asset of interest, the buyer and the engineers could presumably agree to 
split the value of the deal consideration pool, rather than sharing it with 
the seller’s shareholders.51 What, then, drives the existence and increas-
ing popularity of this hybrid transaction structure? 
According to Coyle and Polsky, several factors combine to make 
the acqui-hire a more attractive proposition than an ordinary acquisition 
or a group hire. The most important factor is a set of social norms among 
participants in the Silicon Valley technology industry.52 In the typical 
acqui-hire, the start-up’s employees are not ordinary rank-and-file em-
ployees; instead, they are engineers who were either the company’s 
founders or among the first employees hired by those founder-
engineers.53 Furthermore, the start-up’s shareholders are usually some 
combination of angel investors, venture capitalists, and employee share-
holders (who received their equity as compensation during the early 
stages of the firm’s life).54 The start-up’s departing employees thus usu-
ally have intimate relationships with the start-up’s shareholders, and it is 
these relationships that help explain why some start-ups prefer an acqui-
hire to a group hire. 
                                                 
 48. To be precise, the engineers do ordinarily receive some of the deal consideration pool to 
the extent that the engineers are also shareholders. But the point in the text remains—some signifi-
cant portion of the deal consideration pool goes to people other than the engineers, and because 
those people do not own any assets of interest to the buyer, it seems that the engineers should receive 
all of that pool, or at least split it with the buyer, rather than share it with others. 
 49. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 304–05. 
 50. See CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2014); Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 
189 P.3d 285, 288 (Cal. 2008); Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 303–04. 
 51. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 301 & n.75 (analyzing how the value of the transac-
tion would be split between the buyer and the engineers in a group hire). 
 52. Id. at 311. 
 53. Id. at 286 n.10. 
 54. See id. at 287–88 (noting that start-up capital typically comes from venture capitalists and 
angel investors); id. at 289 (stating that founders and employees usually own common stock in the 
start-up as part of their compensation); id. at 297 (explaining that the deal consideration is paid to 
“the start-up’s outside investors and its employee shareholders”). 
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The relationships between the start-up’s engineers and its share-
holders allow unhappy shareholders to impose at least two kinds of in-
formal sanctions that might encourage the engineers to pursue an acqui-
hire rather than a group hire.55 First, it is likely that the departing engi-
neers will at some future date seek to start another new firm and will 
need financing to do so.56 If the engineers left the start-up via a group 
hire, the spurned investors of the earlier venture would almost surely re-
fuse to finance the engineers’ new venture.57 Moreover, because Silicon 
Valley venture capitalists seek references from the venture capitalists 
who funded an entrepreneur’s prior firm, the spurned investors can fur-
ther punish the departing engineers by providing a negative reference, or 
at least refusing to provide a positive one.58 This kind of informal sanc-
tion thus makes it more difficult for departing engineers to pursue entre-
preneurial projects in the future. 
Second, unhappy investors may impose nonfinancial social penal-
ties on departing engineers.59 Because the investors and engineers are 
often members of the same communities, the investors can lower the en-
gineers’ social standing by doing things like refusing to invite the engi-
neers to community events they host (ranging from birthday parties to 
charity balls) or telling neighbors that the engineers treated the investors 
badly.60 The prospect of these social penalties—and the lowered status 
that comes with them—may be another factor pushing engineers towards 
acqui-hires and away from group hires. And even though the precise 
rules that engineers must follow in order to avoid these sanctions are un-
clear, 61  Silicon Valley lawyers may inculcate in their clients a 
nonadversarial attitude, leading them to pursue the cooperative acqui-
hire rather than the non-cooperative group hire.62 
In addition to the informal sanctions unhappy shareholders could 
impose, intrinsic motivations may also constrain engineers from pursuing 
group hires even when a group hire offers a larger financial payoff than 
an acqui-hire.63 Engineers might, for example, feel a sense of loyalty to 
the investors who first backed the venture because those investors recog-
                                                 
 55. Id. at 314. 
 56. Id. at 314–15. 
 57. Id. at 315–17. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 319. 
 60. Id. at 319 & n.151. 
 61. See id. at 332–36 (arguing that although there is no “standard norm” regarding how much 
money the investors should receive, there will eventually develop a “money back for the investors” 
rule of thumb). 
 62. Id. at 324–26. 
 63. Id. at 317–19. 
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nized the value of the engineers’ ideas while others did not.64 They may 
also feel a desire to be viewed as acting fairly or doing the right thing.65 
Although the engineers’ willingness to split the proceeds with the 
start-up’s shareholders is the core puzzle in the acqui-hire, it is also 
worth considering why the buyer would be willing to structure the trans-
action in this way. After all, if the buyer and the engineers could cut out 
the shareholders, they could split the gains from doing so. The informal 
sanctions the shareholders could impose suggest a connection between 
the buyer’s motivation for entering into an acqui-hire and Blair and 
Stout’s vision of the board as a mediating hierarch. Blair and Stout argue 
that one role of the board is to distribute the surplus created by the team 
to the corporation’s many stakeholders.66 Those stakeholders may in-
clude not only the corporation’s shareholders and employees, but also the 
corporation’s customers or members of the community in which the cor-
poration operates.67 In an acqui-hire, the buyer’s board is authorizing a 
distribution of the buyer’s surplus to the start-up’s investors. As Blair 
and Stout suggest, it is plausible to think of the start-up’s investors as 
also being among the buyer’s stakeholders. This is because the inves-
tors—the venture capital firms—play a key role in the larger Silicon Val-
ley ecosystem that is crucial to the success of all Silicon Valley firms.68 
To be sure, not all acqui-hires are board-approved decisions—corporate 
development departments can complete some of these transactions with-
out board input so long as the price of the acquisition is sufficiently 
low.69 Still, when the board does authorize these transactions, it appears 
to be acting in precisely the way that Blair and Stout suggest it should. 
Another possibility centers on the future relationships between the 
start-up’s engineers and the buyer’s current employees.70 The engineers 
who are going to work with the buyer will often have richer compensa-
                                                 
 64. Id. at 317–18. 
 65. Id. at 318–19. 
 66. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 321 (justifying corporate law as “designed to protect the 
corporate coalition by allowing directors to allocate rents among various stakeholders” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 325 (arguing that the returns to stakeholders are determined in part by political con-
siderations). 
 67. See id. at 278, 288 (including “the local community” as among the stakeholders in most 
public corporations); id. at 300–01, 307–09 (arguing that corporate law permits the board to consider 
the impact of corporate decisions on the community). 
 68. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 322–23. Venture capital firms provide the funding that 
attracts entrepreneurial engineers to Silicon Valley. See id. at 292–93. The resulting concentration of 
engineering talent helps satisfy the staffing needs of the large technology firms in the region. See id. 
at 290–91. 
 69. I thank Elizabeth Pollman for raising this issue. 
 70. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 323. 
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tion packages than employees who had been working at the buyer prior 
to their arrival. The difference in compensation is a source of potential 
friction between the engineers and other employees. By structuring and 
labeling the addition of those engineers as an acquisition, rather than as a 
group hire, the buyer can justify the difference in compensation as owing 
to its purchase of the engineers’ start-up.71 There is again a connection to 
Blair and Stout’s vision of the board as a mediating hierarch: the decision 
to adopt the acqui-hire transaction is part of the board’s effort to avoid 
disputes among team members (i.e., the buyer’s current engineers and 
the start-up’s engineers that will be joining the buyer’s team).72 
Although the preceding factors are the primary drivers of the acqui-
hire trend, there are some secondary drivers as well. Silicon Valley’s en-
trepreneurial culture may hold engineers who sell their firms in higher 
social esteem; therefore, engineers would prefer transactions that look 
like sales (e.g., an acqui-hire) over those that don’t (e.g., a group hire).73 
The engineers’ perceived cost of doing an acqui-hire instead of a group 
hire may be lower than its actual cost because—in line with the predic-
tions of prospect theory—the cost can be framed as a forgone gain, rather 
than as an out-of-pocket loss.74 And because at least some of the com-
pensation in an acqui-hire will take the form of a capital gain (instead of 
being all wage income as it would in a group hire), the engineers can re-
duce their tax burden by pursuing an acqui-hire rather than a group 
                                                 
 71. Id. It is not clear, though, why this strategy should work for very long. The risk in a group 
hire is that the buyer’s existing engineers will resent the richer compensation packages the buyer 
offers the start-up’s engineers and will chafe at the notion of newcomers being paid more than they 
are paid to do the same work. When the buyer points to the acqui-hire as its justification, it is signal-
ing to its existing engineers that the start-up’s engineers are not being paid only to do the same work; 
they are also being paid for the start-up’s assets. But recall that the central feature of the acqui-hire is 
that the buyer does not value the start-up’s assets and will not in fact acquire them, leaving them 
instead with the start-up’s investors. The buyer’s existing engineers should notice that the buyer is 
not in fact retaining the additional assets it is pointing to as justification for offering the start-up’s 
engineers richer compensation. So it seems that the buyer’s engineers should soon see through this 
distraction. 
 72. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 276–82. 
 73. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 320–22. 
 74. Id. at 327–28; see generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). Prospect theory holds that people 
are risk averse with respect to potential gains, which causes them to value potential gains below their 
expected value. Moreover, people are risk seeking with respect to potential losses, which causes 
them to value potential losses above their expected value. Finally, whether an outcome is viewed as 
a potential gain or a potential loss is dependent on framing effects. In the acqui-hire context, the 
engineers will treat the cost of an acqui-hire as less than its actual cost because they will likely view 
the compensation diverted to the investors as a forgone gain, for which they will act in a risk-averse 
manner (i.e., they will value it at less than its expected value). 
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hire.75 According to Coyle and Polsky, this combination of factors large-
ly explains the choice to pursue an acqui-hire. 
III. START-UPS, TEAMS, AND PATENTS 
The value of hiring a team, as opposed to an equivalent number of 
individual engineers, appears insufficient on its own to explain the acqui-
hire trend. This is because the buyer could “recruit and hire a team of at-
will employees away from another company through the normal hiring 
channels.”76 That is, the buyer could add the team through a group hire. 
Moreover, even in an acqui-hire, “the desired employees and the buyer 
will have to negotiate the individual compensation packages on a person-
by-person basis.”77 In other words, there appear to be no negotiating effi-
ciencies from adding the team via an acqui-hire rather than a group hire. 
Therefore, even if the team has a value larger than that of an equivalent 
number of individuals, the choice to structure the transaction as an acqui-
hire has nothing to do with that value. 
Still, there are unanswered questions about the movement of the 
start-up’s intellectual property in an acqui-hire that might indicate that 
teams do matter. The acqui-hire is distinguished from an ordinary acqui-
sition by the fact that the buyer is not interested in the start-up’s tangible 
or intangible assets.78 Instead, the assets revert to the start-up’s inves-
tors.79 It is unclear, however, whether this pattern holds true for the start-
up’s intellectual property. Intellectual property assets—which include 
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets—are intangible assets 
of the start-up. Following the simple story of the acqui-hire, the start-
up’s intellectual property should revert to the start-up’s investors. 
In at least some instances, though, it appears that the buyer in an 
acqui-hire obtains the start-up’s patents.80 Coyle and Polsky’s analysis is 
based on a series of interviews with acqui-hire participants.81 Those par-
ticipants are divided on the role of patents in these transactions. Some 
view patents as potentially valuable assets that the buyer wishes to ac-
quire; others suggest that patents revert to the start-up just like the start-
up’s other assets; and still others indicate that the patents are kept by the 
                                                 
 75. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 329–31. 
 76. Id. at 302. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 293. 
 79. Id. at 296 n.53. 
 80. Id. at 293 n.38; see also id. at 296 (noting that often, in larger acqui-hires, “the only assets 
acquired by the purchaser are whatever intellectual property rights that the startup owns; other as-
sets . . . are left behind”). 
 81. Id. at 285. 
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buyer for defensive purposes (e.g., to limit the risk of an infringement 
suit that might arise if the patents fell into the hands of a competitor).82 
The first task in sharpening the picture of the acqui-hire is therefore to 
determine what actually happens to the start-up’s intellectual property 
when its engineers are acqui-hired. 
A. What Happens to the Start-up’s Intellectual Property? 
The start-up’s intellectual property potentially encompasses patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. Because patents offer protec-
tion for the core technological developments produced by the start-up, 
and because relevant data is publicly accessible, the start-up’s patents 
offer a window through which to begin looking at the role of intellectual 
property in the acqui-hire.83 The pattern of patent transactions offers po-
tential insight into the choice to structure a transaction as an acqui-hire 
because—assuming the buyer wants the patents—it must pursue an 
acqui-hire, rather than a group hire, to obtain them. This is because the 
start-up’s investors likely have plausible legal claims to the patentable 
inventions produced by its engineers. Moreover, third parties could rely 
on those claims to the buyer’s detriment if the buyer failed to obtain 
them, weakening the buyer’s ability to rely on the reciprocal norms iden-
tified by Coyle and Polsky. The buyer accordingly needs the start-up’s 
investors to agree to transfer those claims—which may rest on existing 
patents, pending patent applications, or future patent applications—to the 
buyer. 
There are several potentially plausible sources for the investors’ 
claims to the start-up’s inventions. In the simplest scenario, the start-up’s 
investors can have claims to existing patents. These claims will arise 
from inventions that have been produced by the start-up’s engineers, and 
for which the start-up or the engineers have applied for and received a 
patent. Patent law requires that every patent identify a natural person as 
the inventor.84 The inventor is the person who first conceives of the in-
                                                 
 82. Id. at 293 n.38. 
 83. Looking at patents does not offer a complete picture of the role of intellectual property in 
the acqui-hire because, among other things, these kinds of start-ups may rely more heavily on 
appropriability mechanisms other than patents. Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuel-
son & Ted Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 
Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1290–93 (2009). Moreover, the publicly 
accessible data is likely incomplete. Id. at 1274. Still, because of the ease of access to data, this is an 
appropriate place to begin the analysis and identify avenues for future research. 
 84. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2013) (“An application for patent shall be made, or authorized to be 
made, by the inventor . . . .”); 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 22.01 (2012). 
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vention.85 Joint invention by more than one person is possible; corporate 
invention, however, is not.86 
Although the patent must identify the individual inventors, patent 
law permits those inventors to assign their rights to others, including cor-
porations.87 Patents are treated as personal property,88 and patent assign-
ments are generally governed by state contract law.89 California does 
enforce invention assignment agreements.90 However, these agreements 
cannot cover an invention made by the employee on her own time and 
without using the employer’s resources, unless the invention relates to 
the employer’s business or results from the employee’s work for the em-
ployer.91 Nearly all start-ups use these kinds of invention assignment 
agreements, granting the start-up the patent rights to any invention pro-
duced by its employees during the course of and within the scope of their 
employment.92 As a result, although the patents presumptively belong to 
the engineers, invention assignment agreements usually make the start-
up the owner of the patents.93 If the buyer wants both the engineers and 
                                                 
 85. Conception is achieved when someone has in their mind all of the elements of the invention. 
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (summarizing the 
requirements of inventorship); Merges, supra note 15, at 47–48 (explaining that although conception 
is a “mental event,” it requires objective proof, and the inventor can therefore manipulate the timing 
of conception). 
 86. 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2012) (“When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, 
they shall apply for patent jointly . . . .”); Edwards v. Gramling Eng’g Corp., 588 A.2d 793, 798 (Md. 
1991) (“It is generally recognized that ‘[c]orporations . . . cannot apply as such for a patent.’”). 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013) (“[P]atents . . . shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writ-
ing.”); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 
(2011) (“[A]n inventor can assign his rights in an invention to a third party.”). 
 88. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013) (providing that “patents shall have the attributes of personal proper-
ty”); FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he [relevant] 
statutes establish . . . that patents today have the attributes of personal property.”). 
 89. Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., 109 F.3d 1567, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that 
federal court did not have jurisdiction to decide claims arising out of breach of patent assignment 
agreements because such agreements are governed by state contract law). 
 90. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2870(a) (West 2014); Cadence Design Sys. v. Bhandari, No. C 07-
00823 MHP, 2007 WL 3343085, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2007); Parker A. Howell, Whose Inven-
tion Is It Anyway? Employee Invention-Assignment Agreements and Their Limits, 8 WASH. J.L. 
TECH. & ARTS 79, 90 (2012). 
 91. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2870(a) (West 2014); Howell, supra note 90, at 90. 
 92. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 305 n.88 (noting prevalence of invention assignment 
agreements); Merges, supra note 15, at 7–10 (describing the use of invention assignment agreements, 
and state law limits on them). 
 93. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 
(2011) (“Our precedents confirm the general rule that rights in an invention belong to the inven-
tor.”); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933) (“The respective rights 
and obligations of employer and employee, touching an invention conceived by the latter, spring 
from the contract of employment.”). 
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the patents they produced while at the start-up, then the buyer will need 
to obtain those patents from the start-up’s shareholders. 
Turn now to pending patent applications. Many acqui-hires occur 
within the first few years of the firm’s founding.94 The patent application 
process, meanwhile, typically runs between two to three years.95 These 
timelines suggest that any patent applications that a start-up filed may 
still be pending at the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) when a poten-
tial buyer is deciding whether to do a group hire or an acqui-hire. Sup-
pose, for example, that it took two years for the acqui-hire target to in-
vent the patentable technology and it files for a patent as soon as it in-
vents. If the firm is the subject of an acqui-hire one year later, the appli-
cation will likely still be pending. 
Like issued patents, pending applications can be assigned by con-
tract.96 As a result, a buyer making the choice between pursuing a group 
hire or an acqui-hire will find that the acqui-hire offers the opportunity to 
obtain potential patent rights, but the group hire does not. 
Finally, the start-up’s investors may have claims to future patent  
applications. These claims will again be based on invention assignment 
agreements. Invention assignment agreements are often not limited to 
inventions for which patent applications are filed during the course of 
employment; instead, they reach any inventions produced while the em-
ployee is at the firm, so long as the other requirements of the agreement 
are met.97 These agreements enable the start-up to plausibly contend that 
any patent claiming an invention related to the technology that was being 
developed at the start-up and naming one of its former engineers as an 
inventor in fact belongs to the start-up. 
As an example, imagine that a start-up is working on a new algo-
rithm for recommending products to members of a user’s social group. 
While at the start-up, the engineers conceive of the invention. It is not, 
however, ready for commercialization. In order to delay starting the 
clock on the patent term (which is measured from the day the application 
                                                 
 94. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 295 (stating that acqui-hires usually occur between seed 
funding and a Series A round or between a Series A and a Series B round). 
 95. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 
(2001). 
 96. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013) (“Applications for patent . . . shall be assignable in law by an in-
strument in writing.”). 
 97. See FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reasoning 
that inventor would have “had nothing to give to [the plaintiff] and his purported assignment to [the 
plaintiff would be] a nullity” if the inventor had been subject to a valid invention assignment agree-
ment with his prior employer and if he had invented the subject matter of the patent in suit while he 
was still working for his prior employer). 
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is filed),98 the start-up does not file for a patent while the team continues 
to refine the commercial product that will incorporate the invention. Fa-
cebook, which is working on similar projects, decides to add the start-
up’s team of engineers via a group hire; whatever rights the start-up’s 
investors held in the engineers’ work therefore remained with the inves-
tors. One year after Facebook hires the engineers, it is prepared to launch 
a commercial product incorporating the invention, and files for a patent 
to protect it. 
Facebook’s decision to pursue a group hire instead of an acqui-hire 
will now make this patent vulnerable. The start-up’s investors, who were 
left in the lurch when the engineers left via a group hire, can sue to ob-
tain ownership of the patent on the grounds that the invention falls within 
the terms of the invention assignment agreement the engineers had 
signed with the start-up.99 Even if the investors do not sue, Facebook’s 
ownership of the patent is still uncertain. If it seeks to sue a third party 
for infringement, the accused infringer can defend on the basis that Face-
book does not own the patent.100  
Therefore, in order to ensure that it can use the start-up’s future pa-
tents, Facebook must obtain from the start-up the rights stemming from 
the invention assignment agreements. It can do so with an acqui-hire; it 
cannot do so with a group hire. In sum, because investors have viable 
claims to existing and potential patents covering inventions produced by 
the team of engineers, a buyer interested in obtaining both the start-up’s 
engineers and its patents will have to do so by pursuing an acqui-hire 
instead of a group hire. 
This provides the basis for a hypothesis for a preliminary investiga-
tion. If buyers are interested in the patents, then we should see them con-
sistently obtaining them when they complete acqui-hires. If buyers are 
indifferent to the patents, then we should see them sometimes flowing to 
the buyer and sometimes not. And if buyers view the patents the same 
way they view all of the start-up’s other assets—that is, as worthless—
then we should see the patents remaining with the start-up. Accordingly, 
                                                 
 98. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2013) (providing that a patent term “shall be for a term . . . ending 
20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United States”). 
 99. See, e.g., Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., 109 F.3d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (re-
manding to state court plaintiff-inventor’s claims for rescission of an invention assignment agree-
ment). 
 100. See, e.g., Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., 320 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing that defendant can contend plaintiff does not have standing to sue because it does not have valid 
title to the patent); FilmTec, 939 F.2d at 1571 (accused infringer argued that the plaintiff did not 
have standing to sue because it “lacks title to the patent” by virtue of an agreement to assign the 
invention to the government). 
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to get some preliminary traction on the question of whether patent rights 
affect the decision to pursue an acqui-hire instead of a group-hire, I ex-
amined the frequency with which existing, pending, or future patent 
rights changed hands in a set of transactions. 
In order to identify a set of acqui-hires for analysis, an initial list of 
transactions was produced using the Crunchbase.com acquisition data-
base.101 Crunchbase.com is a crowdsourced database compiling infor-
mation about start-ups.102 The database includes, among other things, 
data on funding events and acquisitions. The acquisitions in the database 
include acquisitions of different kinds, including acqui-hires, although 
they are not so labeled. There are a total of 11,389 acquisitions in the 
database, of which 11,360 have a date listed.103 Although the earliest ac-
quisition dates back to 1960, over 10,000 of the 11,360 dated acquisi-
tions occurred on or after January 1, 2007.104 
The analysis here is limited to acquisitions completed between Jan-
uary 1, 2011 and December 31, 2012. The January 1, 2011 start date was 
chosen because of the slowdown in venture capital activity during the 
2008 through 2010 financial crisis, 105  and because by mid-2011, the 
acqui-hire trend had become sufficiently prevalent to warrant treatment 
in the New York Times, making it likely that a significant number of 
acqui-hires could be identified that year.106 The December 31, 2012 end 
date was chosen because the PTO ordinarily maintains the confidentiality 
of patent applications for eighteen months.107 As a result, many applica-
tions filed since January 1, 2013 and assignments involving them would 
                                                 
 101. CRUNCHBASE, http://crunchbase.com/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). A current version of 
the database can be downloaded here: http://info.crunchbase.com/about/crunchbase-data-exports/. 
 102. About, CRUNCHBASE, http://info.crunchbase.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
 103. These numbers are as of July 31, 2014. The database from that date is on file with the 
author. 
 104. These numbers are as of July 31, 2014. The database from that date is on file with the 
author. 
 105. Press Release, Thomson Reuters & Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Venture Capital Funds 
Raised $8.9 Billion During First Quarter 2014 for Strongest Fundraising Quarter Since 2007 (Apr. 
14, 2014), available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download 
&gid=1049&Itemid=93 (showing decrease in number of funds and dollars raised by venture capital 
firms in 2008, 2009, and 2010). 
 106. See Miguel Helft, For Buyers of Web Start-Ups, Quest to Corral Young Talent, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/18/technology/18talent.html. 
 107. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2013) (providing that applications will be kept confidential subject to 
subsection (b)); 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2013) (providing that, subject to certain exceptions, ap-
plications will be published “after the expiration of a period of 18 months”). The period can be ex-
tended if the applicant certifies to the PTO that it will not seek patents on the technology in other 
countries. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2013). Also, confidentiality ends the moment the patent is 
issued, so the period will be less than eighteen months for those patents issued more quickly than 
usual. 
2015] Buying Teams 669 
not be found in the PTO’s assignment database.108 There were a total of 
3,106 acquisitions in the Crunchbase.com database for this time period 
(1,426 acquisitions in 2012, and 1,680 acquisitions in 2011).109 
In order to identify plausible acqui-hires, I focused on acquisitions 
conducted by the following large technology companies (the number in 
parenthesis refers to the number of acquisitions by that company in the 
Crunchbase.com database for the relevant time period): Amazon (8), 
Apple (4), Facebook (22), Google (40), Groupon (19), Microsoft (8), 
Twitter (12), and Yahoo! (4). A total of 117 transactions met these crite-
ria. 
Lastly, I determined whether the acquisition was an acqui-hire by 
researching whether major technology media outlets110 (1) explicitly de-
scribed the transaction as an acqui-hire, or (2) described the transaction 
as primarily motivated by the acquisition of talent. Because the acqui-
hire is defined in part by the buyer’s motivations, about which only the 
buyer truly knows, one cannot conclusively determine whether a particu-
lar transaction was an acqui-hire. Using these criteria produced a list of 
42 likely acqui-hires and 21 possible acqui-hires.111 These 63 transac-
tions formed the basis for analysis. The remaining 54 transactions were 
deemed not to be plausible acqui-hires. 
In order to obtain information about patents and applications, I re-
lied on the PTO’s publicly searchable database.112 The PTO also main-
tains a publicly searchable database of assignments.113 It includes infor-
                                                 
 108. Exceptions to this would include applications that were granted in less than eighteen 
months. 
 109. CrunchBase Data Exports, CRUNCHBASE, http://info.crunchbase.com/about/crunchbase-
data-exports/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
 110. Websites searched for this purpose were ALL THINGS D, http://allthingsd.com (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2014); GIGAOM, http://gigaom.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2014); and TECHCRUNCH, 
http://techcrunch.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
 111. A transaction was classified as an acqui-hire when the media reports strongly indicated 
that the transaction was motivated by the desire to acquire the talent. A transaction was classified as 
a possible acqui-hire when media reports were unclear about the motivation for the transaction, but it 
seemed likely that the talent was a primary, if not the only, motivation. A transaction was excluded 
from the analysis at this stage if the media reports demonstrated that the buyer was interested in the 
start-up’s corporate assets. 
 112 . To search the PTO databases, see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://patft.uspto.gov/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). For instructions on how to use these databases, 
see Important Notices, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/ 
help/notices.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2014); Full-Text Database Help, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://appft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/help/help.html (last visited Sept. 30, 
2014). For more general information, see Search for Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/search/index.jsp (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
 113. To use the PTO assignment database, see Patent Assignment Query Menu, UNITED 
STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (last 
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mation on assignments of patents and patent applications; it does not in-
clude information on assignments of future patent rights (i.e., invention 
assignment agreements).114 
 
 
 
Percent of All Acqui-Hires in Which Start-Up As-
signed to Buyer 
All Some None 
Patents 9.5% (6/63) 
1.6% 
(1/63) 
88.9% 
(56/63) 
Applications 15.9% (10/63) 
0% 
(0/63) 
84.1% 
(53/63) 
Table 1: All acqui-hires 
 
Table 1 reports, for all 63 transactions, whether the start-up as-
signed all, some, or none of its patents or applications to the buyer. Of 
the 63 transactions, 6 saw the start-up assign all of its patents to the buy-
er; in 10, the start-up assigned all of its applications to the buyer. In 1 
transaction, the start-up assigned some, but not all, of its patents to the 
buyer. 56 of the 63 transactions saw no patents transferred to the buyer; 
53 of the 63 transactions saw no applications transferred to the buyer. In 
most acqui-hires, then, no existing or pending patent rights were part of 
the transaction. 
 
 
Percent of Acqui-Hires Involving Start-up that Owned 
Patents or Applications in Which Start-up Assigned to 
Buyer 
All Some None 
Patents 75% (6/8) 
12.5% 
(1/8) 
12.5% 
(1/8) 
Applications 76.9% (10/13) 
0% 
(0/13) 
23.1% 
(3/13) 
Table 2: Acqui-hires in which start-up had patents or applications 
 
Table 2 reports, for transactions in which the start-up had existing 
patents or applications, whether the start-up assigned all, some, or none 
                                                                                                             
visited Sept. 30, 2014). For guidance in using the assignment database, see Assignments on the Web, 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/products/services/ 
Assignments_on_the_Web.jsp (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
 114 . See Patent Assignment Query Menu, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
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of its patents or applications to the buyer. Of the 63 total transactions, 
only 8 involved start-ups that had existing patents. Of those 8 transac-
tions, the start-up transferred all of its patents to the buyer in 6 of them, 
some of its patents in 1 transaction, and none of its patents in 1 transac-
tion. The start-up had pending applications in 13 of the 63 total transac-
tions. In 10 transactions, the start-up assigned all of its pending applica-
tions; it assigned none of its pending applications in the remaining 3 
transactions. The picture here is that when the start-up had some existing 
or pending patent rights, the strong tendency was to assign all of those 
rights to the buyer. 
 
 Percent of Acqui-Hires Involving Start-up that Owned 
Patents in Which Start-up Assigned to Buyer 
All Some None 
Acqui-hire 66.7% (2/3) 
0% 
(0/3) 
33.3% 
(1/3) 
Possible  
acqui-hire 
80% 
(4/5) 
20% 
(1/5) 
0% 
(0/5) 
Total 75% (6/8) 
12.5% 
(1/8) 
12.5% 
(1/8) 
Table 3: Acqui-hires in which start-up owned existing patents 
 
 Percent of Acqui-Hires Involving Start-up that Owned 
Pending Applications in Which Start-Up Assigned to 
Buyer 
All Some None 
Acqui-hire 83.3% (5/6) 
0% 
(0/6) 
16.7% 
(1/6) 
Possible  
acqui-hire 
71.4% 
(5/7) 
0% 
(0/7) 
28.6% 
(2/7) 
Total 76.9% (10/13) 
0% 
(0/13) 
23.1% 
(3/13) 
Table 4: Acqui-hires in which start-up had pending applications 
 
Tables 3 and 4 separate out the data in Table 2 by acqui-hire and 
possible acqui-hire. They show that the picture is roughly the same 
whether possible acqui-hires are included or excluded from the analysis. 
Including possible acqui-hires increases the rate at which start-ups assign 
all of their existing patents from 66.7% (2/3) to 75% (6/8); doing so de-
creases the rate at which start-ups assign all of their existing applications 
from 83.3% (5/6) to 76.9% (10/13). The overall picture remains the 
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same: existing patents and pending applications largely follow the engi-
neers from the start-up to the buyer. 
 
 
 Assigned to Buyer Remained with  Start-Up 
Patents 15 7 
Applications 24 3 
Table 5: Assignment by patent and application 
 
While the prior tables report data by transaction, Table 5 reports da-
ta by patent or application. Of a total of 22 patents existing at the time of 
the transaction, 15 were assigned to the buyer and 7 remained with the 
start-up.115 Of a total of 27 applications existing at the time of the trans-
action, 24 were assigned to the buyer and 3 remained with the start-up. 
To summarize, the start-up had either existing patents or pending 
applications in 15 of the 63 acqui-hires or possible acqui-hires.116 In 11 
of those 15 transactions, the buyer obtained all of the seller’s existing 
patents or pending applications. In 2 of the 15 transactions, the buyer 
obtained some of the seller’s existing patents or pending applications. 
And in another 2 of the 15 transactions, the seller retained all of its exist-
ing patents or pending applications. 
 
 
Principal Listed in Later Application 
Acqui-hire 33.3% (14/42) 
Possible acqui-hire 42.9% (9/21) 
Total 36.5% (23/63) 
Table 6: Acqui-hires in which start-up’s engineers were later named as 
inventors on buyer’s patents 
 
                                                 
 115. It is possible that some or all of these seven patents did not actually remain with the start-
up, but were in fact transferred even though the parties did not record the assignment with the PTO. 
See infra text accompanying notes 157–60. 
 116. Note that in some transactions, the start-up had both existing patents and pending applica-
tions. 
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Table 6 describes the data regarding applications filed after the 
transaction. One of the start-up’s engineers was listed as an inventor on a 
patent or application filed by the buyer after the transaction in 14 of the 
42 acqui-hires and in 9 of the 21 possible acqui-hires; in 23 of the 63 
transactions, one of the start-up’s engineers was listed as an inventor on 
one of the buyer’s post-transaction patents or applications. These totaled 
53 patents and applications in the 42 acqui-hires, and 68 patents and ap-
plications in the 21 possible acqui-hires. 
In all, in 13 of the 15 acqui-hires in which the start-up owned exist-
ing patents or applications, the buyer acquired some or all of those pa-
tents and applications. Of the 23 acqui-hires in which one of the start-
up’s engineers was listed as an inventor on one of the buyer’s post-
transaction patents or applications, 7 also involved existing patents or 
pending applications; in 16 acqui-hires, the start-up did not own any pa-
tents or pending applications at the time of the transaction, but one of its 
engineers was listed as an inventor on one of the buyer’s post-transaction 
patents or applications. There was only one transaction in which the sell-
er retained all of its existing patents and pending applications and none 
of the start-up’s principals had been listed as inventors on one of the 
buyer’s post-transaction patent applications.117 
These findings support the proposition that it is exceedingly rare in 
an acqui-hire for the buyer to treat the start-up’s patent rights the way it 
treats all of the start-up’s non-intellectual property assets—buyers do not 
allow all of the patent rights to revert to the start-up’s investors. 
B. Why Do Buyers Acquire the Start-up’s Patents? 
While Coyle and Polsky reject the team-based rationale for the 
acqui-hire,118 their interviewees recognize the value of team hiring. The 
interviewees note that “one benefit of an acqui-hire is that you get a co-
hesive team rather than one to two individuals,” and that it “allows you 
to get group talent.”119 Similarly, they argue that the acqui-hire “builds 
on a sense of purpose among the engineers,” and it allows “you to get a 
complete team . . . that already know each other rather than assemble a 
team yourself.”120 Thus, even if team value does not completely explain 
the choice to use an acqui-hire because group hiring is possible without it 
                                                 
 117. One of the start-up’s engineers was later named as an inventor on one of the buyer’s pa-
tents in one of the two transactions in which the start-up did not transfer any of its existing patents or 
pending applications. 
 118. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 302. 
 119. Id. at 294 n.40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. Id. at 294 n.41 (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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(and not inevitable with it), the widespread recognition of the value of 
team hiring reveals that participants are aware of the team production 
problems technology start-ups face and the need to look for solutions to 
them. This suggests that one possible explanation for the unique treat-
ment accorded to patents in an acqui-hire is that patents may play a role 
in facilitating the buyer’s acquisition and subsequent management of a 
team of engineers. 
In this section, I will first describe the team production problems in 
the context of software and similar technology start-ups. I will next ex-
plain the role that patents may play in mitigating those problems. I will 
then conclude with some implications of the analysis for understanding 
the acqui-hire. 
1. Team Production in Technology Start-Ups. 
Recall that team production scenarios are those in which two or 
more inputs combine to produce joint output.121 In these scenarios, the 
inputs are likely to suboptimally invest in the production process to the 
extent that the following four problems are present. First, investment 
may be unobservable; it may be difficult for one team member to deter-
mine whether another team member is investing sufficient resources.122 
Second, effort may be nonverifiable; it may be impossible to demonstrate 
to an outsider, like a court, whether a team member is complying with 
contractual commitments to exert a certain amount of effort.123 Third, the 
output may be nonseparable; it may be difficult to determine the extent to 
which the total output value is attributable to each of the separate in-
puts.124 Finally, the output may be uncertain ex ante; it may be hard to 
know in advance how much the team as a whole could produce if none of 
the team members shirked.125 
Software and other technology start-ups likely face these team pro-
duction problems.126 In these entrepreneurial firms, several programmers 
must combine their efforts in order to create a new product. Like other 
ventures that rely primarily on human intellectual effort, the production 
of software and similar technology is hard to observe or verify. It is un-
likely that any one programmer can easily determine whether another 
                                                 
 121. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 249. 
 122. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1700. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Merges, supra note 15, at 20–22 & nn.68–71 (describing the prevalence of team pro-
duction problems in research and development generally). 
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programmer is thinking about how to most efficiently code a particular 
routine (as opposed to, for example, what she will have for lunch); 
whether that programmer is saving brilliant algorithms for her next pro-
ject and using just “good enough” algorithms for this one; or whether 
that programmer’s inability to complete her piece of the project is due to 
her own subpar efforts or to the inadequacy of another’s contribution. It 
seems equally unlikely that the programmers could predictably demon-
strate any of these things to a court. Moreover, in part because the prod-
uct will be new, it will be hard to know in advance how much it will be 
worth. Finally, once the project is complete, it will be hard to determine 
the percentage of the total output each programmer is responsible for. 
The combination of these factors means that technology start-ups 
are susceptible to shirking, and that the shirking is difficult to control 
through ordinary contractual mechanisms. Ex ante sharing rules (e.g., 
each engineer is entitled to a percentage of the total profit) do not solve 
the problem because each engineer’s reward only partially depends on 
her own effort; this means that each engineer has an incentive to shirk 
because she retains all of the benefits of shirking while bearing only 
some of its costs.127 Ex post distribution of the surplus will be susceptible 
to wasteful rent-seeking efforts as the team members haggle over a fixed 
pie.128 
The team production literature suggests that managers can help 
solve these problems in at least two ways. First, they might be monitor-
ing experts, specializing in detecting difficult to observe investments.129 
Second, they might be enforcement specialists, ensuring that team mem-
bers will be punished (or rewarded) if their joint output fails to meet (or 
exceeds) some threshold.130 In order to fill these roles, managers must, 
among other things: (1) not contribute nonseparable inputs to the joint 
production process; and (2) own the residual claim to the team’s out-
put.131 
                                                 
 127. Id. at 22; Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 266. 
 128. Merges, supra note 15, at 22. 
 129. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1695–96; Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Pro-
duction, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781–85 (1971). 
 130. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1696–99; Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 
13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 326–30 (1982). See also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi G. Zingales, Power in a 
Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998). 
 131. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1706, 1712. 
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2. Patents as (Partial) Solutions to Team Production Problems. 
Patents can help a manager supervise a team production process.132 
By statute, patents are treated like personal property and can be assigned 
by contract.133 An invention assignment agreement can grant the manager 
the patent rights to any inventions produced by the team.134 As Professor 
Robert Merges explains, this mechanism makes it possible for the man-
ager—who has not contributed to the inventive process—to obtain the 
residual claim to the team’s output.135 The prerequisites of team produc-
tion management are therefore in place. The precise function patents per-
form in a given context will vary depending on whether the team produc-
tion process is organized around a manager performing a monitoring role 
or an enforcement and punishment role. 
Managers who perform monitoring roles typically must invest sig-
nificant resources in learning about the particular inputs to the production 
process.136 A manager might, for example, be better able to monitor the 
team’s progress if she knows which programmer is a perfectionist and 
which excels at discovering quick and dirty solutions. The problem is 
that the manager will typically have to reveal at least some of this kind of 
information to the team members. And once the team members them-
selves know about their strengths and weaknesses, they could plausibly 
capture that value by replacing the manager.137 In this scenario, the first 
manager faces the same problem that all producers of information face: 
the person who invests in developing information finds it difficult to cap-
ture the returns to that investment because the information it produces is 
nonexcludable. 
Patents can encourage managers to invest in the learning process 
required of a team production manager because a patent grants its owner 
the right to prevent downstream researchers from incorporating the orig-
                                                 
 132. The arguments here parallel those made in the copyright context in Casey & Sawicki, 
supra note 9. 
 133. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012); FilmTec v. Allied-Signal, 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 
Stanford v. Roche, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (2011) (“[A]n inventor can assign his rights in an invention 
to a third party.”). 
 134. Merges, supra note 15, at 7–10. 
 135. These contracts are, however, imperfect because team members might be able to evade 
them if they leave the firm early enough. See id. at 46–47 (explaining how an inventor can avoid 
employer ownership of an invention by leaving the firm “after one arrives at the general notion of an 
invention, but before any of the provable milestones of invention arrive”). 
 136. Casey & Sawicki, supra note 9, at 1734–36. 
 137. The new manager will not have invested in developing the information about the team, 
while the first manager will have made that investment. All else equal, the new manager should 
therefore agree to manage for less than the first manager would accept. 
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inal invention into their improvements.138 This right increases the costs 
of defection relative to a scenario in which there are no patents because 
leaving the patent-owning manager would leave the manager with a po-
tential veto on the work of the defecting engineer(s) to the extent that 
those engineers wanted to continue working on related projects. As a 
result, if a team wants to produce an invention and retain the ability to 
create (and fully profit from) any improvements to that invention, they 
will most cheaply be able to do so by working with the same manager. 
Managers who perform enforcement or punishment roles (as they 
do when their expertise lies in reducing uncertainty) need to be able to 
break the budget constraint—they need to be able to pay rewards out of a 
pot that is not limited to the value created by the team in the initial pro-
ject.139 Again, the blocking patent rule facilitates the role of the team 
production manager. Because the owner of a patent on an invention is in 
a blocking position with respect to creators of improvements to that in-
vention, the patent owner can raise or lower the costs of participating in 
efforts to improve an invention. When the manager is the patent owner, 
she has the ability to reward teams that succeed by permitting them to 
participate in efforts to improve the invention, and the ability to punish 
teams that fail by prohibiting them from participating in efforts to im-
prove the invention. To the extent that the value of those improvements 
comes from projects distinguishable from the initial project, it is the kind 
of value that the manager can use to elicit effort in the initial project. 
In addition to these management-facilitating functions, patents may 
also reduce transaction costs associated with team production in ways 
described by Professor Paul Heald. First, when a firm uses patents to 
substitute for trade secrets as tools to protect information from competi-
tors, it no longer needs to spend money on the elaborate mechanisms re-
quired to maintain trade secret protection; those mechanisms, like pre-
venting information sharing among team members and monitoring com-
pliance with confidentiality agreements, are particularly costly in team 
production contexts.140 Second, patents allow managers to monitor team 
members by measuring their contributions to the firm’s patent portfo-
lio.141 Finally, patents facilitate team production across firms by clarify-
ing the scope of the information asset over which the firms are contract-
                                                 
 138. See generally Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: 
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994) (describing how patent law’s blocking 
patent rule enables holders of upstream patents to extract value from downstream improvers). 
 139. Holmström, supra note 130, at 327–28. 
 140. Heald, supra note 15, at 487–88. 
 141. Id. at 491–93. 
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ing.142 If patents are able to reduce contracting costs when firms are 
transacting over information produced by a team, it is also plausible that 
patents similarly reduce contracting costs when firms are transacting 
over the movement of the team members themselves. 
3. Patents and Team Production in Acqui-Hires 
It is therefore at least possible that patents facilitate the organization 
of team production. Buyers in acqui-hires are looking in part to capture 
the value created by this particular team of engineers, rather than an 
equivalent number of individual engineers. Because existing and future 
patents covering inventions produced by the team while at the start-up 
can help the buyer keep the team together, buyers will plausibly place a 
higher value on the start-up’s patents and future patents than will others 
(including the start-up’s investors). 
Combined with the start-up’s viable claims to those patents and fu-
ture patents, the buyer’s higher valuation provides a reason to pursue an 
acqui-hire rather than a group hire: the acqui-hire is a mechanism for 
ensuring that present and future patent rights follow the team. Of course, 
patents fulfill several functions, and some of them may overwhelm the 
value of team management. In those instances, patents may stay with the 
start-up or move to the buyer for other reasons. Still, in at least some sit-
uations, the team management function of patents may be sufficiently 
valuable that it pushes a firm towards an acqui-hire and away from a 
group hire. 
The data also helps alleviate some tension in the Coyle and Polsky 
explanation of the acqui-hire. Buyers will ordinarily want to keep the 
engineers for as long as possible. That is why the compensation pool is 
usually structured to include time-vested options—they are meant to dis-
courage the engineers from leaving.143 Of course, there are limits on the 
buyers’ ability to persuade engineers to join them and to stay on board; 
buyers presumably would not want to keep an unhappy engineer. Still, 
the buyers are generally interested in hiring (and retaining) talented engi-
neers. 
Yet one of the key advantages to the acqui-hire in the Coyle and 
Polsky story is that it increases the odds that the investors will back the 
engineers in a subsequent venture.144 The goal of the deal consideration 
pool—the dollars sent by the buyer to the investors rather than to the en-
                                                 
 142. Id. at 489–91. 
 143. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 297–99. 
 144. Id. at 314–17. 
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gineers—“is simply to pay off the investors so the entrepreneurs can ob-
tain . . . reputational benefits.”145 While some of those reputational bene-
fits have only intrinsic value (e.g., engineers will feel good about them-
selves if they demonstrate loyalty to the investors who helped them start 
the venture), arguably the most important reputational benefit of the 
acqui-hire is that the investors will be more likely to back the engineers’ 
subsequent ventures and recommend to other investors that the engineers 
are a good investment.146 All else equal, structuring the transaction as an 
acqui-hire rather than a group hire therefore makes it more likely that the 
engineers will leave the buyer to found another start-up as soon as feasi-
ble. So it is at best a mixed blessing for the buyer to attract the engineers 
through a transaction that facilitates their eventual exit. 
The data presented here helps reduce this tension. Buyers might 
pursue acqui-hires rather than group hires not only to appease engineers, 
but also because they transfer assets to the buyers—namely, existing and 
future patents—that make it easier for the buyers to keep the entire teams 
together and that make it harder for engineers to leave, even after their 
options vest and other inducements to stay or restrictions on leaving ex-
pire. 
C. Cautionary Notes 
Much remains to be done in understanding the intersection of intel-
lectual property and team production. There are important reasons to be 
cautious in drawing conclusions about the relevance of patents to these 
transactions. Most critically, relatively few of the acqui-hired start-ups 
had any patent rights to speak of. Only about one-quarter of the start-ups 
(15 of 63) had either existing patent rights or pending applications.147 But 
when future patents listing the start-up’s principals as inventors are in-
cluded, nearly half of the transactions (31 of 63) could be driven in part 
by patent considerations.148 Therefore, whether the data shows that patent 
rights influenced one-quarter of the transactions or one-half of them de-
pends on whether the acqui-hire in fact affects rights to patents arising 
from applications filed after the acqui-hire. 
There are at least two reasons why that may not be the case. First, 
the start-up’s investors may not have plausible claims to the patents filed 
by the buyers naming the start-up’s founders as inventors. Those claims 
would be based on invention assignment agreements that grant the start-
                                                 
 145. Id. at 332. 
 146. Id. at 312–22. 
 147. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
 148. See supra text accompanying notes 116–18. 
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up the rights to inventions produced by employees during the term of 
employment and within the scope of their work.149 Such claims would 
not be viable if the post-transaction patents relate to technology different 
from the technology developed at the start-up. The work done at the 
start-up may also simply have been too preliminary to reach the patenta-
ble stage. And even when it appears that the inventor acted strategically 
in leaving the firm just before proof of conception, courts are reluctant to 
enforce these agreements and grant the rights to the firm; departing em-
ployee-inventors tend to win.150 
Second, even if there were viable claims, that would not mean that 
the investors would bring them. Venture capitalists are reluctant to pur-
sue legal claims against their entrepreneurs.151 Even though these sorts of 
claims to future patents could be directly adverse to the buyers instead of 
the engineers, they would nonetheless still involve those engineers as 
witnesses and discovery targets.152 
Additional transactions between the parties may also undermine the 
patents’ ability to play team-preserving roles. As at least some acqui-hire 
participants have suggested, the buyer might obtain the patents and then 
grant back to the investors a “nonexclusive, perpetual royalty free license 
to use” them.153 This could permit engineers who do not want to join the 
buyer to remain at the start-up at lower cost than would be the case if the 
start-up could no longer use the inventions produced by the team. Still, 
the start-up cannot use patents to manage the team the way the buyer 
could because, as a nonexclusive licensee, the start-up will not have 
standing to sue alleged infringers154 and therefore will not be able to 
stake out a blocking position with respect to improvements on the pa-
tented technology.155 These licenses are not publicly available; accord-
                                                 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 97–100. 
 150. Merges, supra note 15, at 48–52. 
 151. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 307–10. 
 152. See id. at 310 n.109 (reasoning that entrepreneurs may still respond negatively if the in-
vestor sues a buyer for claims arising out of the entrepreneurs’ departure, even if the entrepreneurs 
are not named in the suit, because the entrepreneurs will still be involved as key witnesses in the 
litigation). 
 153. Id. at 293 n.38. 
 154. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1030–35 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that nonexclusive licensee did not have standing to sue third party for infringement). 
 155. As between the buyer (who as the owner of the patent can sue third parties for infringe-
ment) and the start-up (who as the nonexclusive licensee cannot sue third parties for infringement), 
only the buyer has a blocking position with respect to third parties. In other words, an engineer who 
wishes to work on an improvement without the buyer’s consent can only work at the buyer or the 
start-up; an engineer who wishes to work on an improvement without the start-up’s consent can 
work anywhere. This means that the buyer will likely still better manage the team than the start-up. 
However, when these licenses are in place, the buyer’s relative advantage will be somewhat weak-
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ingly, the data here does not reflect the extent to which the investors can 
still use inventions covered by the patents acquired by the buyer. 
On the other hand, there are at least four reasons why this data may 
understate the importance of patents to the acqui-hire. First, the PTO 
may still be keeping confidential some of the pending applications. Alt-
hough patents are ordinarily made public after 18 months, that period can 
be extended if the applicant certifies to the PTO that she will not be seek-
ing patents covering the technology in other countries.156 Software firms 
like the ones at issue in most acqui-hires may conclude that the benefits 
of continued secrecy outweigh other considerations. As a result, some 
applications may be pending beyond the standard eighteen-month period 
and are therefore still confidential even for transactions taking place be-
tween 2011 and 2012. If so, then the data here does not include all appli-
cations for the identified transactions. 
Second, some assignments may not be recorded. There is no re-
quirement that patent assignments be recorded in the PTO database.157 
Doing so avoids the possibility that the assignee will lose her claim to a 
subsequent bona fide purchaser for value,158 so it would seem unlikely 
that sophisticated actors like the ones engaged in these transactions will 
fail to record their assignments. But the conventional wisdom is that 
many assignments are not recorded in the database, perhaps because par-
ties to patent transactions ordinarily conduct significant due diligence 
and include contractual mechanisms to deter fraudulent transfers.159 As a 
result, some of the patents designated here as not assigned may in fact 
have been assigned. 
Third, the search for subsequent applications filed by the buyer af-
ter the transaction only looked for those naming one of the start-up’s 
principals as the inventor; because the entire roster of a start-up’s engi-
neers is not publicly accessible, it is not possible to search for the names 
of all the potential inventors on patents to which the start-up’s investors 
have plausible claims. It seems likely that other engineers that moved 
                                                                                                             
ened because it can no longer preclude the engineers who prefer to stay at the start-up from working 
on the technology. 
 156. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that, subject to certain exceptions, applica-
tions will be published “after the expiration of a period of 18 months”). The period can be extended 
if the applicant certifies to the PTO that it will not seek patents on the technology in other countries. 
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 157. Graham et al., supra note 83, at 1274 n.60. 
 158. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (“An assignment . . . shall be void as against any subsequent 
purchaser or mortgage for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent 
and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent pur-
chase or mortgage.”). 
 159. Graham et al., supra note 83, at 1274 n.60. 
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from the start-up to the buyer would contribute patentable inventions to 
the buyer following their move. If they did, then the buyer may have 
sought an acqui-hire in part to ensure that it received those patent rights. 
Finally, it is possible that the start-up’s engineers, who have only 
moved to the buyer in the last two or three years, are still working on 
developing technology that has not yet reached the stage at which a pa-
tent application would be viable. The buyers in this data set may later file 
applications arising from the transactions at issue (or have filed applica-
tions that are still within the standard eighteen-month period of confiden-
tiality), even if they have not yet done so. 
Moreover, the data may understate the importance to the acqui-hire 
of intellectual property generally, as opposed to patents specifically. 
Much of the valuable intellectual property produced by these start-ups 
will take the form of trade secrets. Trade secrets can include nontechnical 
business information (e.g., customer lists and pricing strategies) and 
technical information like improved programming algorithms.160 Silicon 
Valley software start-ups appear to prefer trade secrets to patents, in 
large part because trade secrets are much cheaper to obtain.161 
If the start-ups are relying on trade secrets, then that form of intel-
lectual property may still be pushing buyers to pursue acqui-hires. Even 
in California, former employees are not free to use their former employ-
er’s trade secrets. While the state does not apply the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine to prohibit a former employee who had access to trade secrets 
from working for a competitor at all, it does apply ordinary trade secret 
misappropriation principles that may expose a former employee (and his 
new employer) to liability for misuse of the start-up’s trade secret infor-
mation.162 The start-up’s investors could therefore have plausible trade 
secret claims to assert against the buyer if they are unhappy about the 
engineers’ decision to leave via a group hire.163 To the extent the relevant 
intellectual property takes the form of trade secrets, rather than patents, it 
would not be visible in this data. And there is no comparable public da-
tabase of trade secret transactions as there is for patents, making it diffi-
cult to access the relevant information. 
Coyle and Polsky recognize the potential viability of trade secret 
misappropriation claims, but downplay them on the grounds that the in-
                                                 
 160. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
 161. Graham et al., supra note 83, at 1290–93, 1313–14. 
 162. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 304. 
 163. These kinds of claims are, however, difficult to assert with much confidence. See Merges, 
supra note 15, at 47 n.159. 
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vestors would never pursue them.164 What they overlook is the possibility 
that the trade secrets have team-specific value. If the buyer obtains those 
trade secrets, it can use them to continue to bind the team together, and 
the acqui-hire gives the buyer the opportunity to obtain them while a 
group hire does not. Unlike the investors, the buyers in these transac-
tions—large technology firms like Google—do sue former employees for 
misappropriation of trade secrets.165 As a result, the buyer’s ability to 
obtain the start-up’s trade secrets may also help explain the choice to 
structure the transaction as an acqui-hire. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The acqui-hire is still a novel phenomenon, and it is possible that it 
will remain a relative rarity in the world of corporate transactions. One 
implication of the analysis here is that if the acqui-hire spreads, we 
should expect to see it in industries focused on technology development. 
Unless the desired employees are primarily developing patentable tech-
nology (or information that could be protected as a trade secret), the op-
portunity to obtain team-preserving intellectual property rights through 
an acqui-hire does not offer the buyer an incremental value over simply 
adding the employees via a group hire. This could therefore partially ac-
count for the absence of acqui-hiring in, for example, the legal profession, 
where teams of attorneys are frequently hired as a group but without an 
acquisition.166 
Furthermore, we might conclude from here that the acqui-hire is 
more like an ordinary corporate acquisition than the conventional wis-
dom suggests. While the media and the legal academy view these as tal-
ent-driven transactions for which the seller’s assets are irrelevant, it may 
be more accurate to see these transactions as reflecting a shift from an 
industrial-age economy—in which the assets of interest are tangible 
things like factories and machines—to an information age economy—in 
which the assets of interest are intangible things like patent rights. To say 
that the assets of interest are patent rights is not the same thing as saying 
that the buyer is interested in the “talent,” or human capital, of the start-
up. Instead, it is the relationship between that talent and particular (in-
tangible) complementary assets that makes the purchase of the start-up 
                                                 
 164. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 305–06 (recognizing that the “investors could allege 
that the poaching company and the defecting engineer colluded to misappropriate the startup’s trade 
secrets”), and 307–10 (arguing that Silicon Valley lawyers’ culture makes it unlikely that unhappy 
investors would sue their former entrepreneurs). 
 165. See, e.g., id. at 309 n.107. 
 166. See id. at 301–02 (describing prevalence of group hiring of lawyers). 
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attractive, in much the same way that corporate acquisitions in the indus-
trial age may have been influenced by the relationship between the hu-
man capital of a firm’s employees and the particular tangible comple-
mentary assets (e.g., machines and factories used by those employees).167 
Much empirical work remains to be done. The cautionary notes 
sounded above could be at least partially resolved by survey work.168 
Additional data may help confirm or reject the possibility that intellectual 
property rights affect the choice to use the acqui-hire. For example, 
Coyle and Polsky predict that over time, a “money back for the investors” 
rule of thumb will determine the allocation of dollars between the com-
pensation pool and the deal consideration pool. 169  But if intellectual 
property is a critical asset driving buyers to acqui-hires, then there should 
not be a generic rule of thumb guiding the allocation of dollars, which 
will instead be determined by the idiosyncratic value of intellectual prop-
erty obtained in particular cases. 
Finally, I have not yet said much about the corporate law angle to 
this analysis. The engineers in an acqui-hire move from a closely-held 
firm to a large public corporation. It is possible that they are doing so in 
part because they need a mediating hierarch to facilitate their interaction 
with other (non-engineer) team members, and the public company’s 
board is better positioned to fill that role than other options. If so, then 
patents might be viewed as facilitating the movement of employees 
across corporate structures. These, and surely many other issues, remain 
to be resolved by future research. 
                                                 
 167. See Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1757, 1770–71 (1989) (explaining how firms can use ownership of physical assets to obtain 
some control over complementary human capital). 
 168. See generally Graham et al., supra note 83 (reporting results of a survey of technology 
entrepreneurs that was designed in part to fill gaps left by empirical work focusing on publicly ac-
cessible and private databases). 
 169. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 17, at 332–36. 
